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“Heritage is not just the beauty of the ancient monuments, 
heritage is about dialogue among different cultures and 
this is why extremists are afraid of history, they destroy it 
because they don't want this to be true.” 
Irina Bokova, 2016 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Raphael Lemkin proposed the concept of Cultural Genocide in the context of World Wars, 
as a crime that attempts to destroy the identity of a certain people. With globalization, wars gained 
a new dynamic, characterized by the logic of labeling and eliminating the difference through 
identity politics - when the rise of power is done in the name of one specific group and detriment 
to another. The rise of Islamic State in 2014 seemed to follow the identity politics tendency, 
highlighted by the destruction of Cultural Heritage in Syria, drawing attention to the annihilation 
of the region's cultural identity. In this way, this work attempts to analyze international conventions 
and sentences from international court systems regarding the genocidal intent of destroying cultural 
heritage. It also aims to discuss the concept of Cultural Genocide and its importance of protecting 
the Syrian diverse culture. The conviction of Al-Mahdi by the International Criminal Court in 2016, 
for the crime of destruction of cultural heritage, may be, however, a determining factor for holding 
accountable ISIS leaders. Thus, the analysis of the term Cultural Genocide is essential in this 
context. 
Keywords: Cultural Genocide; Destruction of Cultural Heritage; UNESCO World Heritage; War 
crimes; Crimes against humanity; Syria; Syrian conflict; ISIS; Islamic State; New Wars; Identity 
politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
Raphael Lemkin propôs o conceito de Genocídio Cultural no contexto das Grandes Guerras, como 
um crime que objetiva destruir a identidade de certos grupos. Com a globalização, as guerras 
ganharam uma nova dinâmica, caracterizada pela lógica de rotular e eliminar a diferença através 
da identity politics- quando a ascensão do poder é feita em nome de um grupo específico e em 
detrimento de outro. A ascensão do Estado Islâmico em 2014 pareceu seguir a tendência da identity 
politics, realçada pela destruição da herança cultural na Síria, chamando a atenção para a 
aniquilação da identidade cultural da região. Desta forma, este trabalho tenta analisar as 
convenções internacionais e sentenças dos tribunais internacionais em relação à intenção genocida 
de destruir patrimônios culturais. Também pretende discutir o conceito de Genocídio Cultural e 
sua importância para proteger a cultura diversa da Síria. A condenação de Al-Mahdi pelo Tribunal 
Penal Internacional em 2016, pelo crime de destruição do patrimônio cultural, pode ser, no entanto, 
um fator determinante para a responsabilização dos líderes do ISIS. Assim, a análise do termo 
Genocídio Cultural é essencial nesse contexto.  
Palavras-chave: Genocídio Cultural; Destruição de Patrimônio Cultural; Patrimônio Cultural da 
UNESCO; Crimes de Guerra; Crimes contra a Humanidade; Síria; Conflito Sírio; EI; Estado 
Islâmico; Novas Guerras, Identity politics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of new wars emerged after the Second World War, as an attempt to rethink the 
old assumptions of war. Mary Kaldor, a Professor at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, noticed different patterns of violence during an armed conflict, which would constitute a 
new war. Consequently, wars gained a new dynamic, highlighted by the role of identity politics — 
a “claim to power on the basis of a particular identity”1 —, decentralized violence and a globalized 
war economy2. 
Likewise, the rise of Islamic State was followed by its expansion through Iraq and Syria, as 
the group’s primary goal was to establish a State in the Middle East3. Consequently, the group used 
violent methods of warfare to spread hatred and fear, as well as to displace the population that did 
not convert to ISIS strict interpretation of Islam, and to radicalize individuals worldwide through 
social and broadcast media. The group also used the destruction of Cultural Heritage as a means of 
erasing traces from the Syrian diverse culture4. 
Taking into account the complexity of the Syrian conflict and the threat of ISIS to the 
region, this work aims to analyze the importance of protecting Cultural Heritage during armed 
conflicts through international conventions and sentences from international courts5. Also, 
considering ISIS intentional destruction of Cultural Heritage, it is essential to discuss whether the 
concept of Cultural Genocide could be an alternative to enforce the protection of cultural landmarks 
and heritage6. 
In this way, this work has three chapters. The first chapter will focus on a theoretical 
approach of new wars and identity politics. The second will describe the Syrian conflict and the 
rise of Islamic State, addressing the destruction of Cultural Heritage in Palmyra and Aleppo. Lastly, 
the third chapter will analyze how international mechanisms are protecting Cultural Heritage 
during and after war time, and what is the role of the concept of Cultural Genocide towards the 
protection of cultural landmarks. 
 
                                               
1 KALDOR, 2012, p. 7 
2 KALDOR, 2012 
3 WHAT IS LEFT OF ISIL’S ‘CALIPHATE’?, 2017; HILL, 2016 
4 HILL, 2016 
5 HILL, 2016 
6 GOMES, 2015; COLLINS, 2016 
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2. CHAPTER 1 - NEW WARS 
2.1 THE PARADIGMATIC CASE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA  
After the Second World War, the international community perceived a change in the 
warfare and methods of war, especially after the 1990s, with the Cold War. Along with the process 
of globalization, a different pattern of violence, war financing and the claim to power arose. Mary 
Kaldor states that there has been a development of a "new type of organized violence"7, since the 
end of the twentieth century. This new type of organized violence is what Kaldor called a "New 
War"8. 
 Mary Kaldor (2012), in her book New and Old Wars - Organized violence in a Global Era, 
identifies the 'New War' concept as one designed to describe wars from the end of the twentieth 
century. It was also designed in order to enlighten the logic besides contemporary wars, known by 
terms as "wars among the people, wars of the third kind, hybrid wars, privatized wars, post-modern 
wars"9. This work will use the term 'New War' as a guideline to understand armed conflicts after 
the Cold War.  
The first paradigmatic case regarding new wars comes from the Eastern Europe: the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. When analyzing the conflict back in the 1990s, Mary Kaldor noticed 
a different pattern of actors involved as the main parties in the war. At that time, the Bosnian 
warfare exceeded the old assumptions of Cold War. The changing patterns led to the international 
community astonishment, as they could not properly prevent and predict the effects of Bosnian 
conflict10. 
Before 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
which gathered different ethnicities — Muslims, Serbs, and Croats mostly — in its territory. During 
the Yugoslav regime, this ethnic difference was institutionalized, in a sense that neither of the 
groups prevailed nor dominated another inside the political framework. Because of the role of 
ethnic difference in politics, Tito’s regime settled six republics — Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
                                               
7 KALDOR, 2012, p. 1. 
8 Ibidem 
9 Idem, 2013, p. 1. 
10 Idem, 2012. 
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Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia —, and two autonomous regions inside 
Serbia —  Kosovo and Vojvodina — where each would have an ethnic prevalence11.  
 
IMAGE 1: Ethnic Groups in Yugoslavia  
 
SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1992. 
 
                                               
11 KALDOR, 2012; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA [ICTY], 
s.d; BALKANS WAR…; 2016 
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The main tension in the region, however, was related to religion. Part of the Bosnians were 
Muslims, Serbs were Orthodox, and Croats were mostly Catholics. Each ethnicity, connected to a 
religion, would have a political party to run for elections in 1990, the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA) — a Muslim party — the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic 
Party (HDZ). All of them would have supposedly promised to continue the peaceful relations after 
the elections, regardless of the winner. However, this did not actually happen12.   
As Kaldor13 points out "[t]he political goal of the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, 
backed by Serbia and Croatia, respectively, was 'ethnic cleansing'14”. The Bosnian government, at 
that time composed by Bosnian Muslims, had territorial integrity as the main objective. The 
tensions between these groups began to rise as they started having the same goal: the control of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina15.  
Later, the nationalism rhetoric started to appear as the only legitimate discourse, when the 
Yugoslav communist regime began to collapse16. The six republics would claim independence or, 
at least, claim for other republic to have the prevalence of power17. There was no totalitarian 
discourse, such as in Tito’s regime, to maintain the different republics together anymore. As the 
Yugoslav regime lose support, the nationalist rhetoric was highlighted in order to fill this gap, 
deteriorating ethnic groups relations in the region. Also, by the beginning of 1990s, the economic 
and political crises were very severe in Yugoslavia. In this way, "[n]ationalist arguments were a 
way of coping with economic discontent, appealing to the victims of economic insecurity and 
concealing the growing nomenklatura-mafia alliance"18. Followed by a decrease in government 
power, the nationalism would appear in relation with Yugoslavian state disintegration19. 
Apart from the bloody method of war firstly used in the conflict by the Serbs, the ethnic 
cleansing, another different pattern inside the war deserves attention: the participation of 
                                               
12 KALDOR, 2012. 
13 Ibidem, p. 34 
14 "This phenomenon has been defined by the UN Commission of Experts as 'rendering an area ethnically 
homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic or religious 
group." (KALDOR, 2012, p. 34). It can also be described as “… a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious 
group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from 
certain geographic areas” (UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL [UNSC], 1994, p. 33) 
15 LEÃO et. al, 2015. 
16 KALDOR, 2012. 
17 ICTY, s.d.a. 
18 KALDOR, 2012, p. 39 
19 Ibidem 
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paramilitary groups and diaspora external assistance. Franjo Tudman, the Croat President during 
the Bosnian wartime, "developed the horizontal transnational form of organization"20 by means of 
diaspora groups financial support in other regions, such as North America. These groups provided 
ammunition supplies, monetary resources, mercenaries, and influenced the perception of the 
group's identity worldwide, contributing to the inflation of nationalism as well as exclusivist 
politics21. 
In addition, during the Bosnian war, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, spread 
nationalist propaganda through the radio, and other electronic devices, aiming to disseminate fear 
and hatred inside the country. As he was later indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2011, Milošević 
controlled, manipulated or otherwise utilized Serbian state-run media to spread 
exaggerated and false messages of ethnically based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats against Serb people intended to create an atmosphere of fear and hatred among 
Serbs living in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which contributed to the 
forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats, from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICTY, 2011, p.5). 
  
As the conflict escalated, the violations of human rights became more frequent. The 
displacement of people and directed violence against civilians22 were one of the main methods of 
warfare to control the population and politics in Bosnia. The formal and informal armed forces 
would also siege the cities to divert humanitarian assistance. Along these lines, it is commonly 
stated that the Bosnian war was one "against the civilian population and against civil society"23, 
ruining the concepts of religious and ethnic tolerance. The nationalism based on a group identity 
provided the label used to legitimize all the civilian harms, and most specifically the one directed 
to Bosnian Muslims24.  
                                               
20 KALDOR, 2012, p. 41 
21 Ibidem 
22 Article 50. Definition of civilians and civilian population:  
1.  A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A 1), 2), 3) 
and 6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered a civilian. 
2.  The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3.  The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does 
not deprive the population of its civilian character (INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], 
2010, p. 37). 
23 KALDOR, 2012, p. 45 
24 Ibidem 
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2.2 WHAT IS A NEW WAR?  
Bearing in mind the Bosnian war background, it is possible to understand how Mary Kaldor 
came up with the new war theory. This theory, however, needs to be considered inside the 
globalization and technological revolution framework, as a means of approaching governments, 
economies, individuals and cultures25. Even though a lot of attributes of the new war thesis can be 
related to the old war theory - the one regarding the Second World War warfare between states and 
ideologies -, "the term 'new' is a way to exclude 'old' assumptions about the nature of war and to 
provide the basis for a novel research methodology"26. 
 In addition to the globalization process, the Cold War also provided the ground to the new 
wars. After that period, there has been a surplus of ammunition, mistrust in the totalitarian, and 
ideological regimes. The outcome of these factors influenced the state sovereignty and monopoly 
of violence27.  
Combining the elements of globalization with the post-Cold War effects, the new wars 
emerge in loss of state authority to control its territorial borders and the monopoly of violence, as 
transnational military forces, privatized, and paramilitary groups, mercenaries, as well as jihadists 
began to appear as actors of armed conflicts28. In this way, new wars would mostly develop inside 
a context of weakened authoritarian regimes, followed by the transitional politics, because "the 
distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and 
political" is blurred29.  
In the Bosnian case, Tito’s regime could no longer enforce an ethnic integration discourse 
in Yugoslavia. The economic big picture also revealed a decline of employment rates, markets, 
inputs, and currency rates. It jeopardized, consequently, the maintenance of the monopoly of 
violence when the formal economy was rapidly deteriorating. There was neither control nor state 
authority. The country was falling apart. Other groups would then appear to the citizens as an 
alternative to bear the crisis, such as privatized, and paramilitary groups. These groups would be 
maintained through humanitarian aid deviation, international diaspora financial support, looting, 
                                               
25 KALDOR, 2012 
26 Idem, 2013, p.3 
27 Idem, 2012 
28 Idem; 2013 
29 Ibidem, p. 2 
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black market, as well as other informal economies, making state sovereignty and legitimacy 
unclear30.  
According to Mary Kaldor, a new war has three main characteristics, such as “the politics 
of identity, the decentralization of violence, the globalized war economy”31. The logic of these new 
wars can be understood bearing in mind what are the actors, goals, methods and how is the 
financing system of war32.  
The first element to take into consideration regarding the new war thesis is who fights the 
war: its actors. Contrary to the old wars theory, new wars are not only fought by States' Armed 
Forces, it combines different State and non-state actors: jihadists, paramilitary and/or privatized 
groups, warlords, Armed Forces and so on, as seen in the Bosnian war33. 
The second relates to the conflict goals. The objectives of the old war actors were mainly 
regarding political and ideological claims. New wars, however, involve the idea of labeling the 
difference for political demands, in a sense of "identity politics34". The identity politics can be used 
to destabilize a community through forms of population displacement. Also, the identity of a group 
plays an important role when claiming an exclusivist power, and the identity politics also connect 
to ethnic conflicts35. In Bosnia, the ethnic cleansing was an identity mobilization through the excuse 
of self-determination to overlap one ethnicity over another36. 
When bearing in mind the methods of warfare, popular methods for new wars are the use 
of territorial size through population displacement — causing the rise of internal displaced people 
and refugees —, the widespread violence against civilians, and the politics of fear. Although these 
methods were also used during the Second World War, in the new wars they appeared as one of 
the main goals. As seen in the case of Bosnian conflict, Milošević spread fear and hatred over 
ethnicities through the state radio37. 
Besides, due to globalization effects, new wars are not solely financed by states, as they 
have lost the authority to control their territory, economy, and society. Because of the weakened 
legitimacy, the State cannot properly collect its revenues, and different patterns of predatory 
                                               
30 KALDOR, 2012 
31 Ibidem, p. 185 
32 Idem; 2013. 
33 Idem, 2012; Ibidem. 
34 This term will be further analyzed in the next subsection. 
35 KALDOR, 2012; KALDOR, 2013 
36 Idem, 2012. 
37 Idem, 2013 
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economies arose in the form of parallel and informal economy — looting, robbery, pillage, 
diversion of humanitarian aid, intensification of black market, prostitution of women and children, 
and human trafficking38. Another important feature is the diaspora external assistance, as 
individuals, groups and/or governments supporting the identity politics send their financial support 
to the parties of the conflict. This process is highlighted by the globalization effects, which 
facilitates the process of (legal and/or illegal) financial transactions39. In image 2, it is possible to 
understand the financial war support web. 
 
IMAGE 2: Resource flows in new wars 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: KALDOR, 2012, p. 111. 
Along these lines, the economic breakdown is a consequence of state retraction, 
disintegration, external destruction from criminal groups, e.g. robbers, blockades and/or lack of 
essential daily materials, and commodities. In this way, the local market breakdown led the parties 
                                               
38 KALDOR, 2012; LEATHERMAN, 2011 
39 KALDOR, 2012; KALDOR, 2013 
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to the conflict to find other sources of financial support to maintain their activities. This relates to 
a dependence of external assistance, which entails four examples40.  
 Firstly, external assistance may come from relatives living abroad to their respective 
families. These relatives can send financial sources from the country they are staying to their 
families. These sources may end up converted into military assets. The second example derives 
from a "direct assistance from diaspora living abroad"41. Diaspora groups may send military 
equipment and funds to parties to the conflict, "for example, from Irish Americans to the IRA, from 
Armenians all over the world to Nagorno-Karabakh, from Canadian Croatians to the ruling 
Croatian party, and so on"42. 
 But the external assistance may also come from other governments, and ex-colonial powers. 
Adjacent governments can also support specifically some warring parties. This type of example 
was very common during the Second World War, when colonial powers and other countries 
supported other groups based on their ideological interests. The last example is humanitarian 
assistance diversion by governments or parties to the conflict43.  
Bearing in mind all these examples, it is possible to understand how the war is complexly 
compound. As also stated by Mary Kaldor, “a new type of globalized informal economy is 
established in which external flows, especially humanitarian assistance and remittances from 
abroad, are integrated into local and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal 
trading"44.   
 
2.3. THE NEW WARS: ADDRESSING THE VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS  
In new war thesis, the violence escalates and becomes one of the main methods used to 
conquer political control, based on a given identity label. When describing the role of violence in 
new wars, Mary Kaldor points out that it adopts counter-insurgency and guerrilla perspectives, 
respectively applying methods of forcible displacement, and political control based on ethnicity. 
The population displacement, more precisely, appears alongside to assassination of members from 
                                               
40 KALDOR, 2012 
41 Ibidem, p. 109 
42 Ibidem. 
43 Ibidem 
44 Ibidem, p. 110 
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the same ethnic origin, ethnic cleansing, destruction of cultural and historical landmarks, and sexual 
violence towards children and women from a specific group. If the forcible displacement could be 
measured, it would be done taking into account refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and 
civilian killing rates when compared to military official’s casualty’s ratio after the Cold War45.  
Thus, when considering Kaldor's thesis, the violence consists of a method of war aiming 
the widespread brutality against the civilian population. Rethink violence in a new war context 
connects to a long-term persistence to spread violence in numerous ways46. It is so under the logic 
of sustaining a globalized war economy, as “new wars tend to spread and to persist or recur as each 
side gains in political or economic ways from violence itself rather than ‘winning’”47.  
According to the most recent data from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the displacement rate nowadays is unprecedented. More than 65 million 
people flew their home countries, approximately 23 million became refugees, and more than 10 
million are under 18 years old. Additionally, other 10 million do not have a nationality, becoming 
the stateless people, whose basic rights are declined48. 
 
IMAGE 3: Refugee and Displaced Persons Rates 
                                               
45 KALDOR, 2012. 
46 Idem, 2013 
47 Ibidem, p.3 
48 UNHCR, 2017 
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SOURCE: UNHCR, 2017. 
 
When contrasting the civilian killing rates, since the Cold War, the number of civilian 
casualties (also perceived as non-combatants) continues to be higher than war combatants49, even 
though the data can indicate a decrease in casualty’s number during war throughout the time. As 
the main purpose of warring parties is the population displacement, methods of spreading fear and 
                                               
49 Article 43 — Armed forces  
1.  The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government 
or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system 
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.  
2.   Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 
33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities 
(ICRC, 2010, p.36). 
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hatred can lead to the increasing rates of refugees and displaced persons, but it does not necessarily 
mean that the use of violence increase the killing rates, as seen in Image 450.  
 
IMAGE 4: Conflicts are increasingly affecting civilians 
 
SOURCE: CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, 2014 apud MARC, 2016. 
 
As noticed by Adam Roberts51, the civilian casualties must also consider different situations 
when quantified: 
1. Those killed as a direct effect of war; 
2. Those injured as a direct effect of war; 
3. Those dying, whether during or after a war, from indirect effects of war such as 
disease, malnutrition and lawlessness, and who would not have been expected to die 
at such rates from causes in the absence of war; 
4. Victims of one-sided violence, such as when states slaughter their own citizens in 
connection with a war; 
5. Victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence in connection with a war; 
6. Those uprooted in a war - that is, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); 
7. Those who, even after a war is over, die prematurely from injuries sustained in war52. 
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However, the data on civilian casualties are not often completely reliable, since it is difficult 
to know whether a civilian was slaughtered due to incidental military attacks53, or if the civilian 
died because of indirect effects of the conflict, or even due to war side effects (as the increase of 
criminalization rates). Also, since the new wars involved different actors — e.g. privatized, and 
paramilitary groups, militias, mercenaries, and so on — a civilian can be mistaken as a combatant, 
and vice-versa, leading to a more difficult identification, and quantification of civilian casualties54. 
To this extent, the non-compliance with the International Humanitarian Law55 becomes more 
common, as a result of this complicated identification between civilians and combatants, affecting 
a guideline principle of IHL: distinction56.  
In addition, another form of violent method used in new war to force population 
displacement is the sexual violence, which can specifically target an ethnic group. The sexual 
violence can entail the dimensions of rape, collective rape, mass rape campaigns, genocide, and 
ethnic cleansing57. It must be taken into account, as stated by Leatherman, that "sexual violence in 
war is often accompanied by torture, mutilation, and cannibalism. Sexual violence in war can even 
involve forcing family members to commit incest; or child soldiers to commit sexual violence or 
be killed"58.  
In a sense of sustaining a global war economy59, the sexual violence is not only a war 
method, but also a strategy used for socioeconomic, and political purposes, aiming the elimination 
of certain groups, displacement and terrorism60. More often women are the main targets of sexual 
violence. However, children, orphans, child soldiers, and men can be at risk too. The men, as 
                                               
53 EPPS, 2013 
54 KALDOR, 2012 
55 "International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed 
conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and 
methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict.  
    International humanitarian law is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between 
States. International law is contained in agreements between States – treaties or conventions –, in customary rules, 
which consist of State practice considered by them as legally binding, and in general principles.  
    International humanitarian law applies to armed conflicts. It does not regulate whether a State may actually use 
force; this is governed by an important, but distinct, part of international law set out in the United Nations Charter" 
(ICRC, 2004, p.1).  
56 ICRC, s.d.b 
57 LEATHERMAN, 2011 
58 LEATHERMAN, 2011, p. 32 
59 KALDOR, 2012 
60 LEATHERMAN, 2011 
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regarded by Janie Leatherman61, "may be forced to commit sexual violence against family 
members or witness it being done to emasculate them".  
 Lastly, the population displacement can involve the Destruction of Cultural Heritage 
Patrimony, affecting the identity and culture of a given ethnic group. The destruction can be of a 
historical, and religious monument, for example. This method is commonly used to annihilate the 
cultural elements of a group in a particular region62.  
2.4. LABELING THE DIFFERENCE THROUGH IDENTITY POLITICS  
 In the new war perspective, the identity politics appear combined with globalization, in the 
means of the concept of a weak state (commonly associated with the concept of fragile state) in its 
political and economic framework63. According to the Fragile States Index, there are four main 
components to conceptualize a fragile state: (i) cohesion; (ii) economic; (iii) political, and (iv) 
social indicators. These are subdivided in groups of each component: C164) Security Apparatus; 
C2) Factionalized Elites; C3) Group Grievance; E1) Economic Decline; E2) Uneven Economic 
Development; E3) Human Flight and Brain Drain; P1) State Legitimacy; P2) Public Services; P3) 
Human Rights and Rule of Law; S1) Demographic Pressures; S2) Refugees and IDPs; and X1) 
External Intervention65. 
 In addition, the belligerents or warring parties claim the power is based on a label of 
identity, usually with exclusivist interests of accessing State's resources66. This label may also be 
thought based on inborn or an ethnic aspect; a type of nationalism67. Or the identity politics can be 
imposed in the prominence of conflict, taking the form of a strict obedience of specific religious or 
ethnic doctrines; a type of fundamentalism. As Kaldor asserts:  
(...) identity politics tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive. Political 
groupings based on exclusive identity tend to be movements of nostalgia, based on the 
reconstruction of an heroic past, the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and of famous 
battles, won or lost. They acquire meaning through insecurity, through rekindled fear of 
historic enemies, or through a sense of being threatened by those with different labels68.  
                                               
61 LEATHERMAN, 2011, p. 9  
62 KALDOR, 2012 
63 Ibidem 
64 C1 as for cohesion indicator number 1, E1 as for economic indicator number 1, and so on. 
65 FUND FOR PEACE, 2017 
66 KALDOR, 2012; KALDOR, 2013 
67 KALDOR, 2012 
68 KALDOR, 2012, p. 80-81 
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Furthermore, the process of globalization plays a two-fold role in identity politics. First, it 
acts as a reaction of political groups' legitimacy deterioration, serving as political mobilization to 
promote prejudice, fear, and hate in the population. Second, it enforces a feeling of insecurity in 
the economic sector, especially in form of a parallel economy. This type of economy then 
highlights criminal activities, the intensification of black market, human trafficking, and so on69.  
The identity politics, however, are different from ideological politics. The latter refers to 
future integrative projects, an attempt to integrate different people into the same rhetoric. It was 
the case of nationalism during the nineteenth century in Europe. The former, in contrast, 
encompasses the idea of State's economic, and political fragmentation, also related to a surpass of 
one group identity over others70. 
It is possible to understand the difference between ideological politics and identity politics 
while analyzing the case of Yugoslavia. Before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Communist 
regime controlled the six Yugoslavian republics. For the first time, after Tito’s regime collapsed, 
there would be democratic elections to decide which politicians would run the government. 
However, the population was not used to the democratic tradition of voting. This is why 
nationalism appeared to be the most obvious option for the voters because in a society where 
democracy was not a tradition, the national discourse was more "reliable"71. 
Along these lines, Mary Kaldor explains how the nationalism discourse was more reliable 
as a result of the value it had on contradicting the previous regime, the communism72: 
Nationalism represents both a continuity with the past and a way of denying or 'forgetting' 
a complicity with the past. It represents a continuity partly because of the ways in which 
it was nurtured in the preceding era, not only in multinational states, and partly because 
its form is very similar to the preceding Cold War ideologies. Communism, in particular, 
thrived on an us-them, good-bad war mentality and elevated the notion of an homogeneous 
collective community. At the same time, it is a way of denying the past because communist 
regimes overtly condemned nationalism. As in the case of rabid attachment to the market, 
nationalism is a form of negation of what went before. Communism can be treated as 
an 'outsider' or 'foreigner', particularly in countries occupied by Soviet troops, thus 
exculpating those who accepted, tolerated or collaborated with the regime. National 
identity is somehow pure and untainted in comparison with other professional or 
ideological identities that were determined by the previous context73 (emphasis added).  
 
                                               
69 KALDOR, 2013; LEATHERMAN, 2011 
70 KALDOR, 2012 
71 KALDOR, 2012 
72 Ibidem 
73 KALDOR, 2012, p. 83 
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The identity politics' experiences may likewise be found on the context of post-colonial 
states and states with foreign intervention historic background. This was partly followed by the 
European influence in determining ethnic or religious labels in colonies. An example of this 
phenomena was the Hutu-Tutsi difference highlighted after the Belgian government established 
identity cards, when Rwanda was still a Belgian colony. Before the Belgian ruling power in 
Rwanda, the Hutu-Tutsi difference was not very significant. Disillusioned by promises of post-
independence, the new states in Africa and Asia saw politicians using the ethnic or religious 
rhetoric to be sustained in the government74. As portrayed by Mary Kaldor, ”at the same time, 
pressure for democratization led to increasingly desperate bids to remain in power, often through 
fomenting ethnic tension and other forms of identity politics"75. 
Further, in the context of the Middle East, there was also discredit of development, and 
secular state hopes, after the dismissal of colonies in the region. Consequently, there was an 
increase of Islamic movements in the model of identity politics. After the terrorist attack in United 
States on September 11th, 2001, however, Western countries reinforced insecurity through the label 
of Islamic Terrorism, and this further influenced the discourse of "War on Terror"76. 
Diaspora groups play an additional role in reinforcing identity politics in such cases, 
emphasized by the globalization technology and rapid communication across borders. Diaspora 
groups can consist of individuals or families of certain ethnic or religious origin living abroad, who 
perceive their identity nostalgically. They usually finance a conflict through the remittances mail 
to their relatives, or through ammunition supplies, knowledge, and ideas. As diaspora groups live 
outside the conflict zone, they have better access to education, and they can rapidly share it due to 
technology77. Thus, providing "mechanisms for speeding up the pace of political mobilization" in 
their country of origin78. 
To complete, the identity politics, combined with globalization technology and rapid 
expansion, can provide: (i) a way of building alliances and concealing illegal activities; (ii) 
enforcement of political mobilization; (iii) the promotion of particularistic political interest of 
                                               
74 KALDOR, 2012. 
75 Ibidem, p. 85 
76 Ibidem 
77 Ibidem 
78 Ibidem, p. 91 
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remaining in power; (iv) population insecurity; and (v) knowledge and war financial through 
diaspora groups79. Therefore,  
[t]he greater the sense of insecurity, the greater the polarization of society, the less is the 
space for alternative integrative political values. In conditions of war, such alliances are 
cemented by shared complicity in war crimes and a mutual dependence on the continued 
functioning of the war economy80. 
 In the next section, ISIS warfare and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage will be analyzed, 
bearing in mind new war concepts, especially the identity politics. 
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3. CHAPTER II - ISIS AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT  
 In 2011, the uprising of the Arab Spring began with protests aiming at regime change in the 
Middle East. It firstly took place in Tunisia, as the population started claiming democratic social 
and political changes. In Tunisia, the citizens were able to overthrow the Dictatorship regime. 
However, as the Arab Spring spilled over in the region, it had different effects in the neighboring 
countries. In some of them, such as Libya and Syria, the consequences of Arab Spring led to the 
governments' violent repression and an outbreak of civil wars81. 
 In the case of Syria, the protests started in the beginning of 2011, reaching its peak by 
March during the same year, as the violence intensified. By March, the death toll was 
approximately 9,000. At that time, the regime of Bashar al-Assad was responsible for carrying out 
violent repression against the protesters82.  Later on, it would emerge in Syria an armed insurgency, 
followed by Government's counter-insurgency and war83.  
 Syria has an historic context of ethnic diversification in the territory. The Alawites, which 
comprises one of the minorities groups, backed and continue to back al Assad's regime. When the 
Assad government supported an alliance with the Alawites, they had a discourse of a possible 
ethnic integration with the other groups in the region84. This goal was not achieved. And even 
though Alawites, which are Shia Muslims, represent nearly 12% of the Syrian population, they 
control most of the government areas85. 
 Still, most of the Syrian population is composed by Sunni Muslims, which represents over 
70% of the Syrians86. They control parts of the economy and are mostly aligned with western and 
rebel forces87. The main Sunni Muslim Alawite opposition is the Free Syria Army (FSA), which is 
one of the main groups fighting in the Syrian conflict88. 
 The Sunni opposition, however, is not recent. Since 1970s, the Assad family regime has 
been oppressing Sunni Muslims in Syria.   
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From the early 1970s through 2000—at which point Hafez89 died and Bashar assumed 
power—the Alawi Arab, Iranian-aligned, Russian-backed government oppressed Sunni 
(and many Kurdish) Syrians, jailing; torturing; and, in the case of the Hama Massacre90 in 
1982, reportedly slaughtering Sunni by the thousands. is event set the tone for future 
relations with Syria’s Sunni community and almost certainly factored in to the eventual 
2011 revolt91. 
 
As the main Alawite opposition, Assad's regime also spoiled the Sunni population 
throughout the war. According to the International Religious Freedom Report for 2016, "[a]s the 
insurgency continued to be identified with the Sunni population, the government reportedly 
targeted towns and neighborhoods for siege, mortar shelling, and aerial bombardment on the basis 
of the religious affiliation of residents"92.  
 Other ethnic groups are also involved in the war, as the Christians from different Catholic 
branches — mostly Orthodox, Uniate, Roman Catholic, Assyrian, and so on —, Druzes, and Kurds. 
Concerning the Christians, they are spread in the region between Idlib and Homs, as can be seen 
in the Image 5. Even though they are involved in the conflict, they are usually in the crossfire93. In 
addition, the Druzes constitute another minority group in the region, but they had been standing in 
the war with a more neutral posture94. 
 
IMAGE 5: The ethnic distribution in Syria 
                                               
89 Hafez al-Assad was the former Syrian President and father of Bashar al-Assad. 
90 In 1982, there was a Massacre against a Sunni rebellion by the then Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. The massacre 
killed approximately 20,000 people (RODRIGUES, 2011). 
91 CONNABLE et. al, 2017, p. 16 
92  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2016, p.1 
93 Ibidem 
94 GLASS, 2018 
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SOURCE: MARSH; BURGESS, 2012   
 
 The Kurds represent nearly 10% of the Syrian population. The majority of Kurds are 
devoted to Sunni Muslim religion. In addition, the Kurdish population has an important role in 
fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, they are a very religious diverse group 
distributed in parts of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Armenia, composing one of the biggest stateless 
population of the world. Because of Turkey's interests in maintaining the Kurds as a stateless group, 
the Turkish government does not support the Kurds' fight against ISIS95. The Kurds living in Syrian 
territory are also opposed to Bashar al-Assad government, and they support anti-Turkish groups, 
having ties with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)96. 
 Finally, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh in Islamic name) has its origins 
before the American intervention in Iraq and is related to Al-Qaeda. It was created in 1999 under 
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the Al-Qaeda cell leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian extremist97. The United States defined 
ISIS as a terrorist organization, but the term jihadist, "a word of recent coinage deriving from jihad 
meaning “struggle,” as in a personal, spiritual struggle to remain pure in one’s adherence to the 
teachings of Islam, or a physical struggle against the domestic and foreign enemies of Islam" can 
be used98. 
 ISIS mostly targeted the minority groups in Syria, attacking Christians, Alawites, Kurds, 
for instance, which they consider as opposed to ISIS interpretation of Quran, the sacred text of 
Islam99. Between 2013 and 2014, they started gaining control over Syria's and Iraq's territory and 
their goal was to build a Caliphate, which would be an "independent Islamic state in the Middle 
East based on radical anti-Western principles. The Islamic State has come to be known for its 
extremely brutal tactics and was disavowed by al Qaeda in early 2014".100     
Since 2014, the international community got involved in the Syrian war. The United States 
entered in 2014 and created a coalition to combat the Islamic State. During the following year, the 
French and English governments entered the war and launched airstrikes against ISIS as well. 
Russia entered in 2015, backing Assad's regime. Other governments that had Shia Muslim 
majorities also got involved in order to support Assad, as Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah — a Lebanese 
political and military group. The rebels, which fight against the Syrian government, are backed by 
Sunni Muslims countries, as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. Turkey, however, is also targeting 
Kurds, as it fears the Kurdish independence interests. Moreover, Israel is involved in the Syrian 
war intending to fight against Hezbollah and other government forces101. 
 The intensification of international intervention happened after the use of chemical 
weapons in the conflict, which was mostly used by the government. Assad’s regime used chemical 
weapons, such as sarin and mustard gas, against rebel forces. It affected, however, numerous 
civilians in the cities of Homs, Aleppo, Damascus, Ghouta region, Idlib, and Khan Sheikhoun from 
2012 to 2018. Besides, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
confirmed that the Islamic State already used sulfur mustard gas, such as in Marea, in the north 
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part of Syria. Even though, measures to cope with the ongoing chemical weapons use are still 
uncertain in the United Nations Security Council102.  
 In the next section, the ISIS warfare in Syria will be further analyzed. 
3.2 HOW IS ISIS FIGHTING THE WAR IN SYRIA: AN IDENTITY POLITICS APPROACH?  
 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria started participating in the rebellion against Bashar al-
Assad regime in 2011, when the Arab Spring could not fulfill its democratic goals. As the rebellion 
was being transformed into war, the Islamic State took advantage of: (i) the chaos in the territory, 
(ii) the Sunni Muslim population disagreement with the government; and as well as (iii) the 
American troops removal from Iraq103.  
 The ISIS originated from Sunni Muslims from Al-Qaeda in Iraq back in 2003, under the 
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is relevant to mention that the group played a critical role in Iraq's 
sectarian rebellion. However, it was only in 2013 that group presented itself under the name of 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In 2014, they self-proclaimed as a State (or Caliphate) 
of the Islamic State, after achieving control of Iraq's Northern and Western parts, and attacking 
Kurdish and Yazidi religious populations104105. 
 But before advancing into Syria, Al-Qaeda "maintained networks in Syria throughout the 
2003-2011 U.S.-led coalition war in Iraq. It utilized Syria's airports, road networks, and Syrian 
facilitators to help launder money and move foreign fighters to and from Iraq"106. This network 
would reappear with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the future caliph of the Islamic State, as the group 
advanced towards Syria in 2012. At that year, al-Baghdadi tried to merge with Jabhat al-Nusra 
(another jihadist group), but soon they separated, as there has been a disagreement between the 
groups' leaders. Also, al-Baghdadi's cut ties with Al Qaeda during that time107. As stated by 
Connable et al, “this placed IS in opposition to both JaN108 and Al Qaida, and it recharacterized the 
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Sunni population: It now consisted of a fractured array of groups seeking to overthrow Bashar al-
Assad and a new group - IS - that pursued total regional dominance109. 
 In 2013, al-Baghdadi, the ISIS leader, started gaining control over parts of Syrian territory, 
expelling or subjugating opponents of the Islamic State. One year later, the group already had 
control over Raqqa, and they were also expanding themselves towards Iraqi territories110. "By 
2015, IS controlled large portions of Syria's oil resources, its eastern road networks, vital dams 
controlling its water resources, and population centers outside the western-Damascus-to-Aleppo 
corridor"111. Finally, in 2016, the caliph al-Baghdadi attempted to extend the Islamic State in the 
Middle East112.  
 Throughout the wartime, ISIS expanded itself in Iraq and Syria by using violent methods 
of warfare113. Its primary goal was "to establish an independent Islamic state in the Middle East 
based on radical anti-Western principles"114. In Iraq, ISIS controlled almost one third of the 
territory by 2014, for example115. The Islamic State would be called as 'Caliphate' by ISIS, and the 
caliphate organization structure would resemble emirates or princedoms, across Iraq and Syria. 
However, there would also be Caliphate affiliates in Asia, as Afghanistan, and Africa, as Nigeria 
and Libya, as well as other parts of the world116. 
 ISIS's form of conquering territories was to build the idea of subjugating Syrian and Iraqi 
ethnic and religious identity, in order to claim - and remain - in power based on their particularistic 
interpretation of Islam. Because of this form of interpretation, ISIS wanted to augment its status, 
differentiating them from Muslims and other groups, as a tentative of establishing a connection 
with the Prophet Muhammad117.    
Based on Mary Kaldor's concept of new wars and identity politics in relation to Daesh's 
interpretation of Sharia Law, it is possible to notice that ISIS attacks happening through the Syrian 
conflict were related to ethnic and religious features, highlighted by the role of globalization. 
According to the International Religious Freedom Report by the U.S. Department of State (2016),  
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Nonstate actors, including a number of groups designated as terrorist organizations by the 
United States and other governments, such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN, also known 
as al-Nusra Front), targeted Shia, Alawites, Christians, and other religious minorities, 
as well as other Sunnis, with indiscriminate attacks as well as killings, kidnappings, 
physical mistreatment, and arrests in the areas of the country under their control. 
Extremist groups, for example, launched multiple suicide bomb attacks in Latakia 
Province118, aiming their attacks at Alawite Muslims, according to the groups themselves. 
ISIS killed dozens through public executions, crucifixions, and beheadings of men, 
women, and children on charges of apostasy, blasphemy, homosexuality, and cursing 
God119 (emphasis added). 
 
Other examples involve (i) human trafficking (ISIS had been trafficking numerous Yazidi 
women and girls from Iraq to Syria to be "sold or distributed to ISIS members as “spoils of war” 
because of their religious beliefs")120; (ii) punishment for minor religious offenses, as insulting the 
Prophet or not abiding to ISIS costume standards; (iii) conversion of Christians, otherwise they 
would need either to flee the territory, pay a tax or be executed; (iv) destruction of Cultural Heritage 
and religious sites; and (v) dissemination of ISIS interpretation of Islam through scholar 
curriculum, court system, and police force121. 
This all led to an unprecedented population displacement122 of Syrian and Iraqi 
population123 by ISIS, not only because of violent mass atrocities based on a label of identity, but 
partly because of the two-fold role of globalization in highlighting the identity politics. This two-
fold role would be used as a means of political mobilization to promote fear and hatred, and to 
enforce a feeling of economic insecurity. In the Middle East region, the regional insecurity was 
reinforced through the label of Islamic Terrorism after the terrorist attack on September 11, 
influencing the discourse of "War on Terror"124. 
The political mobilization towards prejudice and hatred by ISIS happened through the use 
of social and broadcast media. The so called Islamic State used the radio125, newsletters emails, 
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extensions for browsers, social media (Twitter, Facebook, and other social medias), magazines, 
and even mobile apps for children, to spread the ISIS daily life routine and combatants' activities 
worldwide126. The Amaq Agency was one of the main channels used to spread propaganda and 
radicalization of Islam, in nine languages at least. The Agency aimed to spread ISIS propaganda 
and recruit members across the world, being one of the essential sources for information about the 
Islamic State127. 
The US-EU operation, however, was able to seize Amaq Agency and other channels of 
communication in April 2018. The Amaq Agency claimed ISIS responsible for Paris, Brussels, 
Berlin and Barcelona's attacks back in 2016. But the US-EU operation hampered the spread of ISIS 
propaganda, as it identified servers, and stopped radical content messages from being spread 
worldwide. The operation mobilized the United States, France, UK, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Netherlands, Romania, as well as other countries, to deter the ISIS propaganda machine128.  
ISIS communication channel worldwide spread not only a radical interpretation of Islam, 
but also daily life routine. As there was intense information released in different social and 
broadcast media, ISIS was able to radicalize people from more than 100 countries129. This relates 
to the role of diaspora groups in financing130 and spreading a nostalgic identity label abroad 
through technological means. Taking this into account, it is possible to relate the role of ISIS 
propaganda and radicalization across the globe with the role of diaspora groups in a global war 
economy131. 
In this sense, diaspora groups, influenced by a portrait of ISIS identity, financed and helped 
to spread fear and hatred abroad, resulting in terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, and in 
socioeconomic insecurity132. It is believed that ISIS had wide-ranging resources, coming from the 
black market, and "criminal activities in Iraq, together with robbery, kidnappings, extortions, and 
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even arms and drug trafficking"133. Yet it is not possible to affirm the exact origin of this financial 
support, the money extracted from population across Syria and Iraq reached $8 million. The control 
of oil fields and sell of illegal oil134 also facilitated the collecting of financial resources to the 
terrorist group135. This all led to a feeling of economic insecurity, highlighted by the role of identity 
in labelling the difference to legitimize criminal activities.  
To complete, even though ISIS had lost a huge part of its territorial control in Syria and 
Iraq, compared to 2015136, it is not possible to exclude the possibility of a threat. Partly because of 
"the marked reduction of territorial control by ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will force 
many foreign terrorist fighters to make a choice either to join other groups or to leave the region"137; 
partly because the terrorist "group continues to transform into a terror organization with a flat 
hierarchy, with cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously. The global fight against ISIL 
will have to focus on the threat posed by less visible international networks"138. With this 
organizational structure as a network group, ISIS will probably incite autonomous terror attacks by 
sympathizers across the globe139.  
  
3.3 THE ISLAMIC STATE WARFARE AND DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE: 
THE ANNIHILATION OF SYRIAN CULTURE 
 When bearing in mind ISIS' methods of warfare, the identity politics played a role in 
defining labels to the Syrian population, leading to mass violence atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and 
destruction of Cultural Heritage of those "different" from ISIS140. More specifically, the destruction 
of Cultural Heritage appears as "the destruction of history and culture by removing the physical 
landmarks that define the social environment for particular groups of people. The destruction of 
religious buildings and historic monuments is supposed to erase all traces of cultural claim to a 
particular area"141. 
                                               
133 GULMOHAMAD, 2014, p.2  
134 "The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) estimates that, in 2016, ISIL earned approximately 
$260 million from illicit oil sales (...)" (UNSC, 2017, p. 3). 
135 GULMOHAMAD, 2014 
136 Appendix 1 and 2 show a map of ISIS territorial loss. 
137 UNSC, 2018, p. 2 
138 Ibidem, p. 2 
139 UNSC, 2018 
140 HILL, 2016; KALDOR, 2012 
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 ISIS documented the destruction of religious and archaeological sites, some considered as 
World Cultural Heritage by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), as a means of annihilating the Syrian culture and spreading hatred and fear. The 
terrorist group destroyed these patrimonies because they believe other cultures were idolatrous142, 
and ISIS was against it143. If the cultural sites were not destroyed, they were either used for military 
purposes or looted144.  
Known for their video footage documenting the atrocities they commit, the Islamic State 
uses the destruction of cultural heritage as a means of cultural cleansing; literally erasing 
the culture and history of Iraq and Syria, considering all religious shrines and 
archaeological sites to be idolatrous145.  
 
 UNESCO defines Culture Heritage146 as a legacy of tangible and intangible heritage. 
Tangible cultural heritage comprises (i) movable; (ii) immovable, and (iii) underwater aspects. 
Movable cultural heritage refers to objects, e.g., artworks, manuscripts, sculptures. Immovable 
cultural heritage consists of landmarks, monuments, such as mosques, shrines, and archaeological 
sites, for instance. And underwater cultural heritage relates to underwater ruins, caves, landscapes, 
shipwrecks, cities, and so on. Moreover, intangible cultural heritage refers to social practices, oral 
traditions, rituals, and performing arts, etc147.  
 According to the World Heritage List, there are six World Heritage sites in Syria148: Site of 
Palmyra; Ancient City of Aleppo; Ancient City of Damascus; Ancient City of Bosra; Crac des 
Chevaliers and Qal'at Salah El-Din; and Ancient Villages of Northern Syria149. They represent 
traces from Pre-Christian, Cristian, Greek as well as Muslim cultures. However, because of the 
Syrian conflict, most of them were either destroyed or damaged, especially by ISIS150.  
                                               
142 This can also be regarded as an iconoclast attitude. "Iconoclasm is understood as a historically pervasive tactic of 
removing the animacy, agency, effective power, and present liveliness of images, and is attested in the history of all 
monotheistic religions, not just Islam" (HARMANSAH, 2015, p. 176). 
143 HILL, 2016 
144 RHARADE, 2017 
145 HILL, 2016, p.195 
146 The concept of Cultural Heritage in the International Law will be further analyzed in Chapter 3. 
147 UNESCO, s.d.e 
148 According to the Decision about World Heritage properties of the Syrian Arab Republic, the six monuments are in 
the List of World Heritage in danger. For more information, pleace proceed tor: 
<https://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/5954>. 
149 UNESCO, s.d.d 
150 RHARADE, 2017 
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As will be seen in the following images, the destruction of Cultural Heritage was a frequent 
method used by Daesh to destroy and annihilate Syrian cultural traces. In some cases, the damage 
was irreversible, according to Irina Bokova151, the UNESCO Director-General152. In this section, 
however, we will only focus on the cases of destruction of immovable World Cultural Heritage by 
ISIS in Palmyra and Aleppo. 
3.3.1 Palmyra 
 The Cultural Heritage in Palmyra was one of the first sites to be affected by ISIS. Located 
in the eastern side of Damascus, the Syrian capital, Palmyra was known for being an oasis for those 
travelling on the Silk Road during the 2nd and 3rd century, and it was especially important for the 
Roman Empire. By the 2000s, Palmyra was one of the main Syrian tourist attractions153.  
 ISIS, however, firstly seized Palmyra in May 2015, destroying the ancient the Al Lat Lion 
statue. The statue was related to an archaic Islamic goddess, and it could be found near the Palmyra 
Museum. This intentional infliction of cultural damage also led to the execution Khaled al-Assad, 
an archeologist responsible for the Museum's antiquities and excavations in the site. He was 
murdered because he declined to tell ISIS the location of valued objects154. In addition, the terrorist 
group destroyed the Temples of Bel and Baalshamin155, Palmyra's Monumental Arch156, Al 
Sutaniya Mosque, and the Museum of Folk Arts. The Museum objects that could not be protected 
were trafficked or found in the black market later on157.  
 
IMAGE 6: Temple of Bel, Palmyra, on 27 August 2015, before its destruction 
                                               
151 For more information regarding Irina Bokova statement about Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Syria, please 
proceed to: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-03-12/statement-un-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-
unesco-director-general.  
152 KALDOR, 2012; UN, 2014.  
153 CURRY, 2015 
154CURRY, 2015; BUFFENSTEIN, 2017 
155 The Temple of Baalshamin was very special to the Syrian Culture, since it was well-preserved since its construction, 
2000 years ago (BARNARD, 2015). 
156 This Arc was also a very famous tourist attraction in Syria. Its origin back from 20 centuries ago, but it was destroyed 
in October 2015 by the Islamic State (HENDERSON, 2016). 
157 BUFFENSTEIN, 2017 
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Source: PLÉIADEs et. al, 2015 
IMAGE 7: Temple of Bel, Palmyra, on 31 August 2015, after its destruction 
  
SOURCE: PLÉIADEs et. al, 2015 
 ISIS lost the control of Palmyra in March 2016, but it regained control in December of the 
same year. The second time Daesh seized the city, it damaged the Tetrapylon monument158 and a 
Roman theater159. In such a way, ISIS was trying to impose its label of strict interpretation of Islam 
by destroying traditional monuments, as recording and documenting the destruction160.  
IMAGE 8: The Tetrapylon monument before its destruction by ISIS 
                                               
158 UNESCO released a video about the destruction of the Tetrapylon landmark. The link is: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPwt8w95Cz8>.  
159 BUFFENSTEIN, 2017 
160 HARMANSAH, 2015 
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SOURCE: VAN OERS, s.d. 
 
IMAGE 9: Damage to the Tetrapylon as seen on March 2, 2017 
 
SOURCE: Directorate-General of Antiquities & Museums [DGAM], 2017 
 
IMAGE 10: The Roman Theater before the destruction by ISIS 
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SOURCE: GAGNON, 2010 
IMAGE 11: Damage to the Roman Theater seen on March 2, 2017 
 
SOURCE: Directorate-General of Antiquities & Museums [DGAM], 2017 
 
3.3.2. Ancient City of Aleppo  
The Ancient City of Aleppo once represented an important trade route, from 2000 B.C. Yet, 
ISIS occupied Aleppo from July 2012 to December 2016, being the Umayyad Mosque on the 
conflict front line161. In the meantime, the group destroyed approximately 30% of the Umayyad 
                                               
161 BASSAM, 2016 
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Mosque, built during the 12th century. The Mosque was a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage and 
its importance related to the Greco-Roman period162.  
IMAGE 12: Ablution fountains of the Umayyad mosque, Aleppo, in early 2014 
 
SOURCE: UNESCO (s.d.b) 
 
IMAGE 13: Umayyad mosque, Aleppo, in early 2014 
 
SOURCE: UNESCO (s.d.b) 
The next section will explore the importance of Cultural Heritage, in a broader thinking, to 
the International Law. Also, it will be analyzed how the destruction of this traditional landmarks 
can be related to the concept of Cultural Genocide.  
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4. CHAPTER III - CULTURAL GENOCIDE?  
4.1 THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 After the World War II, there was a need of guaranteeing the international protection of 
Cultural Heritage through international law mechanisms. In this context, the 1954 Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict emerged. Also known as 1954 
Hague Convention, this was the first international treaty adopted aiming the safeguard of Cultural 
Heritage during an armed conflict163. However,  
[t]he first binding international obligations for the protection of cultural heritage related 
to the rules of war emerged from the series of international conferences held in 1899 and 
1907. The Regulations annexed to the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (1899 Hague II Convention) and Convention (IV) respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague IV Convention), were found to be 
customary international law and ‘recognized by all civilized nations’ by the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in 1945164. 
 
The emergence of other Conventions after the World War II expressed the importance of 
Cultural Heritage to the international community, as an element that connects the future of a group 
or society with past generations165. For example, in 1972, the Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage came out. This Convention settled two 
focuses regarding the Cultural Heritage: nature preservation and conservation of cultural heritage. 
By doing this, the Convention attempted to enforce the importance and relation between nature and 
social interaction through the Cultural Heritage166.  
 In this way, regarding the protection of this traditional landmarks, there are key 
conventions to understand what is defined as Cultural Heritage in the international law, especially 
regarding armed conflicts and tangible or intangible Cultural Heritage167. In this work, we will 
focus on three documents and how they define the concept of Cultural Heritage: (i) 1972 UNESCO 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; (ii) 2003 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage168; and (iii) 1954 Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.  
                                               
163 UNESCO, 2017a 
164 VRDOLJAK, 2016, p. 3 
165 UNESCO, 2017b 
166 Idem, s.d.c 
167 FINLAND, s.d. 
168 "The 2003 UNESCO Declaration is an important reference point because it provides for State and individual 
responsibility for intentional destruction of cultural heritage (Articles VI and VII); and outlines the obligation to 
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4.1.2 Cultural Heritage or Cultural Property? 
The 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage defines Cultural Heritage in the Article 1.  
Article 1. For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as 
"cultural heritage":  
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements 
or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations 
of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art 
or science;  
groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their 
architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science;  
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including 
archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, 
ethnological or anthropological point of view. (emphasis added)169 
 
 To the monuments, groups of buildings and sites be registered in the World Heritage List, 
they must attend the criteria requirements170, as defined in the Operational Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention. However, the article 1 above refers to tangible 
Cultural Heritage171. Only in 2003, the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage would define the intangible Cultural Heritage, in these means 
 
1. The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces 
associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize 
as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from 
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response 
to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them 
with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and 
human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely 
to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human 
                                               
cooperate in respect of protecting cultural heritage against intentional destruction (Article VIII). It calls on States to 
establish jurisdiction and effective criminal sanctions against individuals who commit or order others to commit such 
acts. It requests States to cooperate with one another and UNESCO including through information sharing; consultation 
in cases of actual or impeding destruction; assist in respect of educational, awareness-raising and capacity-building 
programmes for prevention and repression; and assist judicial and administrative processes. States are also encouraged 
to establish jurisdiction and effective criminal sanction against individuals ‘who have committed or have ordered to be 
committed acts referred to [individual criminal responsibility] and who are found present on its territory, regardless of 
their nationality and the place where such act occurred’ (para.VIII(2)). The Declaration requires states to recognize 
‘international rules related to the criminalization of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, in particular, when intentional destruction of cultural heritage is linked to those violations.’" (VRDOLJAK, 2016, 
p. 24) 
169 UNESCO, 1972, p. 3 
170 All the requirements can be seen through this link: <https://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide12-en.pdf>.  
171 UNESCO, 2012 
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rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, 
groups and individuals, and of sustainable development. 
2. The “intangible cultural heritage”, as defined in paragraph 1 above, is manifested inter 
alia in the following domains: 
(a) oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the intangible 
cultural heritage; 
(b) performing arts; 
(c) social practices, rituals and festive events; 
(d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; 
(e) traditional craftsmanship172. 
 
 However, when it comes to the protection of Cultural Heritage under the International 
Humanitarian Law, the concept of Cultural Property is used, instead of Cultural Heritage. Cultural 
Property is defined in the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954173: 
Article 1. Definition of cultural property  
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term `cultural property' shall cover, 
irrespective of origin or ownership:  
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; 
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic 
interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or 
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books 
or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;  
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable 
cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and 
depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, 
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a);  
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) 
and (b), to be known as `centers containing monuments'174.  
 
Even so there is a slight difference, it is possible to notice that the concept of Cultural 
Heritage has a broader meaning than Cultural Property. This is so given that the concept of Cultural 
Heritage encompasses the notion of intangible heritage, as oral traditions, performing arts, dance, 
rituals, and so on175.  
This can readily be seen from the text of Article 2 of the above Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 17 October 2002, which includes in 
the definition of “intangible cultural heritage” the practices, expressions, knowledge, skills 
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— as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith 
— that communities, groups and in some cases individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage176. 
Despite the disparity between the concepts, one thing is certain: there is an internationalist 
aspect in the provision of the protection of cultural landmarks during an Armed Conflict "in the 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, of 26 March 1999, which applies to both international and non-
international armed conflicts"177. The protection of Cultural Property in the 1954 Hague 
Convention, in this way, "necessarily invokes an internationalist perspective of cultural 
property"178, as seen in the preamble of the Convention: “being convinced damage to cultural 
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, 
since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world,” and should therefore “receive 
international protection”179.  
4.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING CULTURAL HERITAGE DURING AN ARMED 
CONFLICT  
There are three approaches of why it is important to protect Cultural Heritage (or Cultural 
Property in its stricter meaning in the 1954 Hague Convention) during an armed conflict, especially 
for military purposes. They are: (i) abstract; (ii) strategic; and (iii) legal180.   
The abstract approach refers to the expression of identity itself, related to the importance 
of a cultural heritage to the identity of specific groups, population and/ or, the mankind. As 
portrayed by O’Keefe et al, "it is the tangible expression of the unchanging human condition and 
of the creative genius, diversity and memory of humankind. Its preservation is essential to human 
wellbeing and flourishing"181. 
The protection of Cultural Heritage in its strategic approach appears as indispensable, since 
the destruction or looting can encompass the logic of global war economy and the propaganda of 
hatred and fear182. In this way, the protection by Armed Forces183 can prevent the looting and 
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trafficking of cultural properties by other belligerents, as a way of financing terrorist groups or 
non-state armed groups, such as ISIS. As seen in the logic of global war economy in Chapter I, 
looting, robbery, pillage and the intensification of black market can enforce different patterns of 
predatory economies in the form of parallel and informal economy184.   
Furthermore, the protection of cultural properties would also prevent the emergence of 
hostility inside the community where the cultural property is, because the destruction "offers the 
adversary a potent propaganda weapon, undermines support on the home front and among allies 
for the continued pursuit of victory"185. In the case of ISIS, for example, the documentation of 
destruction of cultural landmarks in Syria was also a way of spreading a propaganda of fear and 
hatred worldwide186, damaging not only a group identity, but the mankind as a whole187.  
Lastly, the legal importance of protecting cultural heritage relates to the state or individual 
responsibility, as a means of compensating the damage. The responsibility comprises elements of 
guilt or omission, when encompassing the destruction, damage or misappropriation of cultural 
heritage during armed conflicts. In such a way, an individual or State may be held accountable for 
destroying, failing (intentionally or not), or not taking all necessary measures to prevent the 
destruction of Cultural Property during an Armed Conflict. Besides, the responsibility also 
concerns the submission of the case for competent authorities to investigate, prosecute, and judge, 
when applicable, war crimes and/ or, crimes against humanity188. In the case of the new war 
paradigmatic case of Bosnian conflict, for example,      
Several of the defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg were 
convicted for their role in the systematic destruction and plunder of cultural heritage in 
occupied territory. More recently, a number of the accused before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia were convicted for their intentional 
destruction and damage of cultural sites during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. 
The deliberate destruction of cultural property has also been the sole focus of one 
conviction to date before the International Criminal Court, and the Prosecutor has 
expressed an interest in pursuing further such cases should the opportunity arise. 
                                               
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government 
or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system 
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict (ICRC, 2010, 
p. 32). 
184 KALDOR, 2012 
185  O'KEEFE et al., 2016, p. 1 
186 HILL, 2016 
187 Ibidem, O'KEEFE et al., 2016 
188 O'KEEFE et al., 2016; MILLIGAN, 2008 
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Prosecutions for war crimes against cultural property have taken place at the national level 
as well189.   
 
 Bearing in mind the approaches of why it is important to protect Cultural Heritage during 
an armed conflict, the next section will focus on how the international courts are deciding in the 
case of destruction of cultural landmarks. 
4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS' DECISIONS CONCERNING THE DESTRUCTION 
OF CULTURAL HERITAGE DURING ARMED CONFLICTS  
After World War I and II, the Allied Forces190 created the International Military Tribunal, 
commonly known by Nuremberg Tribunal, in order to prosecute the Nazis who perpetrated crimes 
during the war. The crimes included the destruction of properties not justified by the principle of 
military necessity191. Therefore, the Nuremberg Tribunal can be considered as the first court to 
address the destruction of cultural landmarks192.  
Still, the first decision by an International Court to be held in trial involving the destruction 
of Cultural Heritage came from the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in 2001, in the case of Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar. The case regarded the killing and 
inhumane treatment of civilians in the city of Dubrovnik, coast of Croatia, in 1991, by the Yugoslav 
People's Army (JNA) General Pavle Strugar, and its subordinates. The case also involved the 
destruction of Cultural Heritage, commercial, religious and private buildings, yet the destruction 
was not an indictment to the case. Still, the intentional damage to the Cultural Heritage defined by 
UNESCO played an important role to this trial in an international court, serving as evidence, 
influencing the public perception to the case, and leading to an interpretation of destruction of 
Cultural Heritage as a crime against humanity193.   
 In Dubrovnik's case, the ICTY interpretation about the destruction of World Heritage as a 
crime against humanity was based on the element of systematic damage and attack at cultural 
properties. The interpretation also considered the extension of cultural loss for humanity194. 
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191 The principle of military necessity is associated with the principle of proportionality and encompasses the legitimate 
acts under the International Humanitarian Law that can be taken during an armed conflict (ICRC, s.d.a) 
192 USHMM, s.d. 
193 ICTY, 2001; Idem, s.d.b.  
194 ICTY, s.d.b 
39 
 
Only in 2016, however, the destruction of Cultural Heritage appeared as the main 
indictment to an international court, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. Al 
Mahdi, a member of a jihadist organization in Mali, was found guilty for attacking cultural 
properties, in which nine represented UNESCO World Heritage sites195. The case was judged by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC)196, and it was the first time this court litigated the destruction 
of Cultural Heritage as a war crime, applying the Article 8 (2) (e) (iv) from the Rome Statute.197. 
According to the Article 8,  
2. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means:  
a)  
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (...) 
e) (...)  
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick 
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;198 (emphasis added) 
 
 As it was analyzed by the ICC's sentence, Al Mahdi was guilty of directing an attack to 
cultural monuments in the context of war, even though it was not an international armed conflict 
— in which the cultural monuments would be only viewed as civilian objects199. Still, Al Mahdi 
was then 
Found guilty, sentenced to 9 years. On 27 September 2016, Trial Chamber VIII found Mr 
Al Mahdi guilty, as a co-perpetrator, of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks 
against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, including nine 
mausoleums200 and one mosque in Timbuktu, Mali, in June and July 2012201. 
 
The Al Mahdi case was very important to the international protection of Cultural Heritage, 
since it provided the ground for the prosecution of crimes against Cultural Heritage under 
international courts. Before this decision, most of the international tribunals systems have been 
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silent in prosecuting and suing States or individuals for the destruction of Cultural Heritage, with 
the exception of ICTY. Consequently, the Al Mahdi prosecution can serve as a basis for the crimes 
of destruction of Cultural Heritage by ISIS not go unpunished by the international community. In 
this way, it is necessary to consider the prosecution of Daesh leaders for encouraging the attack at 
UNESCO World Heritage and cultural properties202. 
The ICTY and ICC cases showed that the destruction of Cultural Heritage may be regarded 
as a war crime or crime against humanity — this one depending on the interpretation of the case203. 
Either way, the prosecution for destruction of cultural landmarks is important as a means of 
deterrence to contain crimes against Cultural Heritage, aiming at the discouragement of future 
perpetrators, as well as the protection of a social and symbolic significance for a group's and 
mankind’s identity204.  
 
4.4 BEYOND CULTURAL LOSS: THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL GENOCIDE AND THE 
(IN)APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION FOR GENOCIDE  
 
When bearing in mind the massive destruction of Cultural Heritage in Syria, with the ISIS 
intention to erase traces from the Syrian diverse culture, the identity politics still play a role in 
defining the patterns used to target cultural properties205. Also, considering the consequences of 
violent attacks to Syrian Cultural Heritage, which spread fear and hatred across the Middle East 
region and the world, the international protection of this heritage became fundamental. 
Consequently, it is necessary to take into account that the destruction of Cultural Heritage in Syria 
goes beyond a cultural loss206.  
In this way, recognizing the impact of destruction of cultural landmarks to a group identity, 
Raphael Lemkin proposed the crime of barbarity and vandalism during the 5th International 
Conference for the Uniformization of Criminal Law in 1933. Firstly, Lemkin considered the 
destruction of artistic and cultural works of especial importance as a crime of barbarity and 
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vandalism. In a second approach, he considered the element of intentional destruction of a specific 
group or community207. 
Raphael Lemkin, however, realized that the destruction of Cultural Heritage, associated 
with the intention of destroying a group, totally or in part, due to racial, ethnic or religious purposes, 
would actually be considered a Cultural Genocide. Along these lines, there was a provision of a 
crime of Cultural Genocide during the process of writing the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This provision contemplated the elements of damaging or 
destroying a cultural identity by (i) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; (ii) 
forced exile of cultural representatives; (iii) the prohibition of the group's language; (iv) the 
destruction of books or the prohibition of publications; and (v) the destruction of religious works, 
monuments and historical or religious objects208. The destruction of Cultural Heritage would 
damage, in this way, the group's identity, partly or in a whole.  
The only element that succeed referred to the forced transfer of children from the group. 
This element was related to the provision of the crime of Genocide, as it is possible to see in the 
Article II of the Convention:  
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (emphasis added)209. 
 
Despite the efforts, the Cultural Genocide did not proceed as a crime in the Convention 
about genocide. The crime of Genocide, therefore, would only consider a physical or biological 
element, which can be inferred by the Article II, but not in an identity and cultural heritage 
approach210. 
Along these lines, the ICTY already decided that the intentional destruction of cultural 
landmarks would not be considered an element of genocide, as can be seen in the case Prosecutor 
v. Radislav Krstić in 2004211: 
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The Genocide Convention, and customary international law in general, prohibit only the 
physical or biological destruction of a human group.39 The Trial Chamber expressly 
acknowledged this limitation, and eschewed any broader definition. The Chamber stated: 
“[C]ustomary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the 
physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. [A]n enterprise attacking only 
the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these 
elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community 
would not fall under the definition of genocide212. 
  
 The ICTY considered in this case, however, that the attacking of cultural monuments served 
as an evidence to convict the defendants for the crime of Genocide. Therefore, it is crucial to take 
into account that the intentional destruction of cultural landmarks and heritage can be very 
important when considering the circumstances of war crimes against humanity — as in the 
Dubrovnik's case in Croatia213 — or genocide, serving as evidence to the trials214. It is also of great 
importance to consider that physical or biological destruction of a group is often followed by 
attacks on Cultural Heritage or properties215. This can be regarded in the case of ISIS attacks as 
well — in which the terrorist group killed and displaced thousands of Syrians, while documenting 
the destruction of UNESCO World Heritage sites216. 
Even though the Cultural Genocide may not be considered a crime under the International 
Criminal Law, or the International Humanitarian Law, the recent conviction of Al Mahdi by the 
ICC will possibly promote more discussions about the intentional destruction of Cultural Heritage 
during an armed conflict, aiming to erase and annihilate a group identity, in total or in part, relating 
to a genocidal intent. Consequently, that would lead, in some way, to the consideration of a Cultural 
Genocide and to the examination of the Syrian war context, the identity politics concept and ISIS 
warfare. In order to individually prosecute and hold accountable the leaders of Daesh, the 
discussion will most likely lead to a consideration of a Cultural Genocide, bearing in mind Lemkin's 
element applied to ISIS violent methods of war217.  
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The provision of Cultural Genocide as a crime would then represent a major step towards 
the protection of vulnerable groups and cultural identity during an armed conflict, under the 
International Criminal Law and the IHL. This provision would also enforce the protection of 
cultural tangible and intangible heritage as an affirmation of identity and the very existence of the 
diverse groups, communities, and the mankind218.  
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5. CONCLUSION  
 The concept of Cultural Genocide was firstly proposed by Polish Raphael Lemkin in the 
context of World Wars, as a crime that attempts to destroy the identity of a certain people. With 
globalization, wars have gained a new dynamic, characterized by a "new type of organized 
violence"219. According to Mary Kaldor, this new type of organized violence is called a "New 
War"220, and it was perceived during the Bosnian conflict in 1992. The Bosnian war was a 
paradigmatic case to the new wars theory, as it exceeds the old assumptions of what was known as 
a war. In this way, "the term 'new' is a way to exclude 'old' assumptions about the nature of war 
and to provide the basis for a novel research methodology"221.  
 During the Bosnian war, it was possible to notice different patterns of actors, goals, methods 
and financing system of war222. There were, however, three new wars’ characteristics that guided 
this work: the politics of identity, the decentralization of violence, the globalized war economy223. 
They were related to: (i) a logic of labelling and eliminating the difference through identity politics 
— when the rise of power is done in the name of one specific group and detriment to another; (ii) 
the combination of different state and non-state actors fighting the war; and (iii) the different 
patterns of predatory economies in the form of parallel and informal economy — looting, robbery, 
pillage, diversion of humanitarian aid, intensification of black market, prostitution of women and 
children, human trafficking224, and diaspora external assistance. All of them were highlighted by 
the globalization and the weakening of the state, as well as used to finance the war through the 
logic of identity politics225.  
Bearing in mind the elements of new wars, analyzed in Chapter 1, the rise of Islamic State 
in 2014 was followed by the destruction of Cultural Heritage in Syria, drawing attention to the 
annihilation of the region's cultural identity. The group destroyed UNESCO World Heritage sites, 
as Palmyra and Aleppo, documenting through video footages the damages as a means of spreading 
fear and hatred in the region226. This can relate to the new wars concept of identity politics, as there 
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were also massive ISIS acts perpetrated in order to displace the population, being the destruction 
of Cultural Heritage one of those methods. In this way, the identity politics of Daesh can be 
translated as a form of conquering territories, built on the idea of labelling and targeting Syrian 
identity, claiming the power based on ISIS particularistic interpretation of Islam227. 
Along these lines, the social and broadcast media was commonly used by Daesh to 
influence diaspora groups worldwide, sharing daily life routine to a radical interpretation of 
Islam228. The ISIS communication channel was very intense, contributing to the role of diaspora 
groups in spreading a portrait of ISIS exclusivist identity as well. Also, diaspora groups were 
important because they helped the Islamic State through a new war financing web229.  
Besides, the Syrian conflict had numerous actors fighting the war, such as state and non-
state actors, involving from Syrian government members to ethnic minorities, as well international 
actors - such as the U.S., Russia, Middle East and European countries -  and jihadists, rebels, and 
other groups. This background led to a decentralized violence in the conflict across the region, 
contributing to the complexity of the Syrian war230. 
Considering this complexity and ISIS intentional destruction of Cultural Heritage as a way 
of erasing traces from Syrian diverse culture, this work aimed at highlighting the importance of 
protecting Cultural Heritage during armed conflicts through international mechanisms231, 
especially through the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage; the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage; and the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict232.  
The importance of protecting Cultural Heritage during armed conflicts surpass a material 
loss, but relates to (i) an abstract approach, referring to the identity of a certain group or the 
mankind; (ii) the strategic, in which the protection of cultural properties can prevent the looting, 
trafficking and financing of parties to the conflict, and, at the same time, it can prevent the arise of 
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hostility in war by the propaganda of fear and hatred in the region; and (iii) a legal approach, 
referring to a state or individual responsibility233.  
When facing the recent conviction of Al Mahdi by the ICC, it is possible to notice that 
Cultural Heritage has gained more significance throughout the time. Since the end of World Wars, 
the destruction of cultural landmarks only served as evidence or enforcement of other convictions, 
mostly regarding war crimes or crimes against humanity234. Even so, there has not been a 
conviction of non-state actors or individuals by international court systems solely regarding the 
destruction of Cultural Heritage as a war crime. In 2016, however, the International Court has 
decided following a different pattern in the case Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. Al Mahdi, 
a member of a terrorist group, was found guilty for destroying Cultural Heritage in Timbuktu, Mali, 
considered the destruction a war crime235.  
However, considering the context of a different dynamics of war through the identity 
politics, the conviction of Al Mahdi could possibly serve as a basis to open the discussions about 
the intentional destruction of Cultural Heritage by non-state actors or terrorist groups during an 
armed conflict. Especially in the cases of intentional destruction of Cultural Heritage that have a 
genocidal purpose of erasing or annihilating a group identity, totally or in part236. 
Acts committed with the intent to destroy, in a whole or in part, some group for ethnic, 
religious and/or identity reasons are typified as genocide by International Conventions. Yet, the 
destruction of cultural heritage with the intention of erasing cultural traits of a people's identity 
does not yet constitute a crime of cultural genocide237. According to the understanding of 
international tribunals, the destruction of cultural heritage serves only as evidence to prove other 
crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The condemnation of Al-Mahdi in 2016 
for the crime of destruction of cultural heritage may, nevertheless, be a determining factor in 
thinking about the importance of protecting cultural identity and hold accountable those guilty in 
the Syrian conflict, especially the Islamic State. In this way, the analysis of the term Cultural 
Genocide is essential in this context, as a means of enforcing the importance of protecting the 
identity of a group, community and the whole mankind238.  
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To conclude, as the term “new” in the new war concept was thought as a way of excluding 
“old assumptions about the nature of war”239, the concept of Cultural Genocide could be a way of 
excluding old assumptions of Genocide.  
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7. APPENDIX 
ANNEX 1: ISIS territory control map 
 
January, 2016 
 
October, 2017 
 
58 
 
SOURCE: LISTER, 2017. 
 
 
ANNEX 2: Syria map in February 2018 
 
SOURCE: SYRIA'S CIVIL war explained from the beginning, 2018 
  
